Kusama JAM Prime vs. WFC #573/#1926: Mapping the Governance Conflicts

Late on 22 Oct 2026 I was reading the Polkadot Forum thread dissecting the SDFI decision paper v0.1.0 when the structure of the argument clicked. The paper collides with two earlier referenda, but only one collision is open. The other is silent. That asymmetry is the whole story.

Kusama holders are being asked to choose among four JAM Prime packages (WFCs #671 to #674), each offering 40 coretime-years for US$4.32M paid in DOT from the Kusama Vision fund. If one passes, it goes to DOT holders through a Polkadot-side resolution in the paper Appendix B, and Kusama validator set, staking, and staking issuance would be retired. That is a major reversal of WFC #573. Voters deserve to know which conflicts are open and which are buried before the polls close.

Key Metrics at a Glance

What the Decision Paper Proposes

The SDFI decision paper (Emiel Sebastiaan and Arief Ernst, published 19 Oct 2026) trades capacity against duration. All four options equal 40 coretime-years, carry the same 450,000 JAMKB-equivalent footprint ceiling, protected always-accumulate resources, protected KSM control over the Kusama service, and a Fellowship mandate for migration and maintenance. All four cost the same US$4.32M, converted to a fixed DOT amount from the 90-day average DOT price before the selected referendum approval date, capped at 5,000,000 DOT, paid from eligible Kusama Vision fund resources committed under WFC #498.

Among the options that pass, the one with the largest conviction-weighted aye tally is selected, then sent to DOT holders via the Appendix B resolution.

Conflict 1: Kusama WFC #573 (open and intended)

WFC #573 chose an independent, lightweight JAM for Kusama: 32 cores versus Polkadot 341, 1-second blocks, and KSM as the native token for storage, staking, and coretime, with security costs estimated at roughly 2.4% KSM inflation worst case. It passed with about 144,000 KSM aye against almost no nay. The alternative in the same round, WFC #574 (a full-spec JAM for Polkadot to join and share security), was rejected with about 240,000 KSM nay.

Clause 1 of each resolution says that, if selected, it replaces the direction set by #573. Superseding a Wish for Change with a later one is normal OpenGov. But three things are worth weighing: the paper never mentions #574 even though it shared the one-instance-serving-both idea; the authors admit the September position paper had no full budget for an independent JAM; and WFC #676 offers holders a comparison-first option. If none of #671-#674 passes, no new mandate is created and #573 remains Kusama latest expressed direction.

Conflict 2: Polkadot WFC #1926 (silent)

This is the conflict the paper does not address. WFC #1926, executed on Polkadot, requires that any DOT received from JAMKB (the proposed fixed-supply token backing JAM footprint) be burned in full automatically, and that every footprint allocation, whoever receives it, be paid at the prevailing market price in DOT and burned. No giveaways, no grants, no below-market loans. It passed with about 129.48M DOT aye. Its companion WFC #1927 (DOT-only settlement) was rejected, so settlement currency stays open, but under #1926 non-DOT proceeds must be converted to DOT and burned.

The packages cut against #1926 in three ways: they bundle 450,000 JAMKB-equivalent of footprint inside a price calculated from coretime alone so the footprint carries no price of its own; they fix that price in DOT from a 90-day average for terms up to 20 years before JAMKB release mechanism and price exist; and they contain no burn provision, with Appendix B asking DOT DAO to accept a single DOT amount for the complete package without mentioning #1926.

The duration test makes the mispricing visible. Footprint quantity and price are identical in all four options while the reservation runs 5 to 20 years. Under any market-priced lease, reserving the same footprint for 20 years costs more than for 5. The September position paper shows the same signal: 80 CTYs plus the same 450,000 JAMKB-equivalent priced at US$8.64M; halving coretime halved the price while footprint stayed constant. At most one of the four implied yearly footprint prices can be a market rate.

Leaving the footprint unpriced and the payment split to DOT DAO later discretion is exactly the discretionary step #1926 was written to exclude. A compliant restructuring would identify a footprint share, price it at market, and burn it, which likely requires a new Kusama decision. The author earlier observation that burned DOT cannot also fund operations helps explain why DOT DAO may balk at the same total.

What Voters Should Ask Before 3 Nov

Risks to Watch

• Security tradeoff: retiring Kusama validators concentrates security in DOT staking on JAM Prime; the paper does not quantify this.
• Latency regression: under 2 cores, system chains may slow to ~6-24 second blocks, a material change from 1-second blocks.
• Governance integrity: an unaddressed conflict with an executed Polkadot WFC (#1926) could later be challenged as a defect in the DOT-side resolution.
• Fiscal optics: paying from the Kusama Vision fund in fixed DOT while DOT holders bear unburned-footprint risk.

TL;DR

• What: SDFI decision paper offers four Kusama-on-JAM-Prime packages (40 CTYs, US$4.32M in DOT each) via Kusama WFCs #671-#674, closing 3 Nov 2026.
• Open conflict: Each resolution openly supersedes WFC #573 independent 32-core, 1-second-block JAM.
• Silent conflict: The packages bundle 450,000 JAMKB footprint with no market price and no burn, conflicting with executed Polkadot WFC #1926.
• Watch: Whether Appendix B DOT-side resolution mentions #1926; whether WFC #676 forces the comparison first; block-time impact under low-core options.

Sources

• Polkadot Forum: Kusama on JAM Prime vs. WFC #573 and WFC #1926
• SDFI decision paper v0.1.0 (GitHub sdfinst/publications)
• Kusama WFC #573
• Polkadot WFC #1926
• Kusama WFCs #671-#674 and #676

Gemma Nguyen is Content Lead and Journalist at TotesTek, covering Polkadot, Kusama, and the governance, infrastructure, and DeFi decisions that shape the ecosystem.